

INTEGRATING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM WITH THE WAR ON DRUGS

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USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

INTEGRATING THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM WITH THE WAR ON DRUGS

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ABSTRACT

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To ensure success in the Global War on Terrorism, it is imperative that our fight against drug proliferation be integrated with our Global War on Terrorism initiatives. The application and use of Diplomatic, Informational, Military, Economic, Law Enforcement and Intelligence efforts in combating drug trafficking and countering terrorism will contribute to our Nation's goal of maintaining a secure and stable environment. This paper will explain the correlation between illicit drug trade and terrorism and the synergized efforts needed to combat these detrimental activities. This monograph's focus will be primarily on the dire need to synergize the war on drugs with the war on terrorism. There is a direct link between Illegal drug activity and destabilization of democracies around the world. Illegal drug production and proliferation not only undermines America's culture and security but undermines the rest of the world's stability. The intent of this monograph is to clearly show that the United States needs an aggressive strategy that integrates all available resources in our global fight to stop narco-terrorism. Measurable success in this fight is vital in stopping this clear and present danger to our national security and world stability.

INTEGRATION OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM WITH THE WAR ON DRUGS

.....links between illegal drugs and terrorism are important considerations in formulating a drug control policy and a campaign against terror.....

—Mark A. R. Kleiman¹

The Department of Homeland Security and U. S. Northern Command were created in the aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks on our country. Their primary mission set was homeland security focusing on using all means available to combat terrorism with some of the resources allocated to this mission being diverted from our nation's fight against drugs to fighting terrorism. All would agree that defeating terrorism is of vital national interest but the cliché of robbing Peter to pay Paul rings with irony since there is a direct relationship between drugs and terrorism. To establish an effective, viable national strategy dealing with drugs and terrorism, both the global fight against terrorism, and the global fight against drugs must be seen as one, not as separate entities.

To ensure success in planning for the long war, the United States must integrate its current counter-drug efforts with fighting the global war on terrorism. To accomplish this critical national objective, it is vital that we link our current counter-drug strategy (CDS) with the global war on terrorism (GWOT) strategy. Just as we are transforming our nation's military capability to deal with the constantly changing global terrorist threats, we must also transform our fight against drugs from a domestic interdiction fight to that of a global one to confront the 21st Century drug proliferation challenges effectively.

The drug threat is global in nature and affects every country in the world, as its illicit proceeds are used as the primary funding tool for terrorist activities worldwide. Steven Casteel, Assistant Administrator for Intelligence for the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), stated to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary in May of 2003, that 39 percent of the State Department's known terrorist organizations have some degree of connection with drug activities.²

Using Elements of National Power

This paper will illustrate the need for cohesive and integrated strategies to offset the increased proliferation of illicit drug trafficking throughout the world. The paper will also depict the role of state and non-state actors and how their funding needs for terrorism are derived from the illicit drug trade with the focus on the arrival, transit, and source zones of drug influence that mandate the need to establish a cohesive strategy that unites counter-drug and counter-

terrorism policies, with the goal of eradicating the threat to our national security and interests throughout the world.

The instruments of national power certainly have significant legitimacy in our strategy of combating illegal drugs and terrorism. The military element of national power is of particular importance in our overall effort to combat drug proliferation, with all other elements of national power having important but less than vital roles. All instruments of national power need to be addressed and implemented, so that a unified strategic effort can be employed, resulting in the eventual reduction of illicit drugs and their ability to fund terrorism. Our current strategies include: National Security Strategy, Global War on Terrorism Strategy, National Strategy for Homeland Security, National Drug Control Strategy and the National Military Strategy. These strategies need leveraging and synchronization to ensure an effective, aggressive coordinated plan is established and implemented using all the elements of national power to achieve success. We cannot continue on the same single continuum that focuses on separate strategies. An effective counter-narcotics strategy at the National level requires cross-leveling of these strategies, ensuring a more cohesive overarching political strategy, that when applied from a united national and international power front ensures success.

“Narco-terrorism is defined as a complex nexus between the illegal drug trade and terrorism. DEA describes narco-terrorism as a group of organized individuals working together in order to further, or fund, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets with the intention to influence their respective ideologies.”³ DOD joint doctrine defines narco-terrorism as narco-supported terrorism, which is terrorism that benefits from or uses drug trafficking to further individual or group terrorist activities.⁴

The National Defense Authorization Act of 2004 authorized the Department of Defense's military forces, which are under the command and control of U.S. Northern Command, to provide support to local and federal law enforcement agencies conducting counter-narcotics activities, and to also provide, subject to applicable laws and regulations, support to law enforcement agencies conducting counter-terrorism activities.⁵ Although the military's role in counter-narcotics was considered outside the parameters of being a core military mission, and more in the realm of law enforcement duties, the correlation of drugs and terrorism, with reference to illegal drug proliferation had a direct correlation to terrorism. This is the needed nexus for DoD's continued and needed involvement in using its resources in support of federal and domestic law enforcement agencies in their mission to combat illegal drug trafficking.

Drugs and Terrorism Nexus

Prior to the tragedy of 9/11, the focus of this nation's CDS was primarily on drug treatment and prevention programs, curbing the domestic appetite for drugs, instead of focusing CDS on the source and arrival zones to disrupt or prevent the flow of illicit drugs into our country.⁶ Law enforcement agencies, including federal and local forces, considered illicit drug trafficking and terrorism as separate issues, but after 9/11, these criminal entities were treated as one. The Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) was the first government agency to find conclusive evidence establishing a direct correlation between terrorism and illicit drug activities.⁷

There were previous indications that illicit drug profits were being used to fund terrorism. For example, there was New York City's World Trade Center bombing in February 1993, resulting in the arrest and eventual conviction of Mohammed Salameh, an impoverished, illegal immigrant, who had access to \$5 million owing to illegal drug profits.⁸ The illicit drug trade financed international terrorist organizations prior to 9/11, but after the tragedy, drug profits and their use for financing terrorism became more prevalent; in fact, more terrorist organizations began using the illicit profits from the drug trade to finance their illegal activities.⁹

Frank Cilluffo, the Director of the Counterterrorism Task Force, stated that regardless of the terrorists actively cultivating and trafficking the drugs or the tax levy the terrorists imposed on drug profits, the proceeds from drug trafficking generates enough money to fill the void left by state sponsors.¹⁰ As Steven Casteel mentioned in his testimony, the events of 9/11 have renewed our attention on an old problem, narco-terrorism.¹¹ It is imperative that we see these terrorists as a destabilizing element and use all methods at this nation's disposal, to including effects based planning, to disrupt and significantly reduce the profits they can make from the drug trade. As Sun Tzu says, in order to win the war, we must first know our enemy.¹² Our enemies are those state and non-state actors that use the legitimate means of globalization to harbor and market their illicit products, which clearly benefit their terrorist end state. The secondary effect of the proliferation and illegal use of drugs is the slow destruction of the moral fiber of civilized society

There is a clear and direct correlation between illicit drug trade and terrorism. Hezbollah used drug profits to support their terrorism campaign against Israel; Al Qaeda used the profits from the sale of hashish to finance the Madrid terrorist bombings of 2004.¹³ The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC); the United Self-Defense Groups of Colombia (AUC); the National Liberation Army (ELN); Hamas involvement in the tri-border area of Paraguay, Argentina, and Brazil; the Sendero Luminoso (SL) in Peru; the Taliban in Afghanistan; the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK); and the Abu Sayyah Group (ASG) in the Philippines have all

been identified as terrorist organizations by the Department of State, and DEA has direct evidence that drug profits fund their operations.¹⁴

Colombia has three terrorist groups on the U.S. State Department's list of terrorist organizations, all of which are known to generate revenue from drug trafficking: the FARC, the ELN, and the AUC.¹⁵ The FARC and ELN are considered Marxist guerrilla groups, advocating the overthrow of the Colombian government. With the collapse of the farming industry, these three Colombian guerrilla groups turned to the illicit narcotics trade, kidnapping, extortion and intimidation to garner their revenue and influence. It is estimated that the income of the three Colombian guerrilla groups is as high as \$600 million dollars a year, or over \$1.5 million dollars a day, with \$360 million going to finance FARC activities, these illicit earnings exceed that of the Banco de Colombia, one of the country's largest banks and the sales of Celumovil, one of Colombia's largest cellular phone companies.¹⁶ If you peel back the layers further, you will see that 48% of the FARC's revenues come from its involvement in drug trafficking, 36% from extortion, 8% from kidnapping, 6% from cattle theft, and the remainder from robbery of financial institutions and other sources.¹⁷ The ELN obtains 60% of its income through extortion, 28% from kidnapping, 6% from drug trafficking, and 4% from cattle theft.¹⁸ Some estimates place FARC drug revenues alone to be as high as \$600 million per year.¹⁹

Comment [feb1]: I still don't get how the estimated income of the three groups can be \$600 million if the FARC's revenues are \$600 million alone.

The paramilitary group, AUC is a different type of guerrilla organization than the ELN or FARC mainly because they were formed to counter-act guerrilla violence.²⁰ While the concept of peasants and farmers arming to protect their property is a long-standing practice in Colombia, the 1980s saw the creation of more organized groups, many of which had ties to drug cartels. In recent years the main organization in this category has been the AUC, which has also been linked to the drug trade.²¹

The Colombian case gives us special pause: the illegal activities of these armed groups may provide a model for other world insurgents to use the illegal drug trade as the means to sustain their operations. It is certainly a model that worked for Peru's SL for a time.²² According to DEA, Peru's SL is considered one of the most violent insurgent groups in South America, its mantra being to overthrow the Peruvian government so they can achieve and maintain their self-described form of agrarian communism.²³ Their activities were largely funded by the taxes they levied on coca production, and today, they still use drug profits to finance their operations.²⁴

From the examples above, we can see a direct correlation between terrorism and illicit drug proliferation. As our strategic focus changes from a conventional one, where we opposed nation states, to one that includes rogue nation states and stateless organizations that rely on

drug profits to feed their respective causes, it is imperative that our strategy in dealing with these state and non-state actors change as well. In his recent posture statement to the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Peter Pace reiterated that the threat of narco-terrorism and the need for combating drug trafficking is of vital interest to our nation. He stated that combating drug trafficking is important to strengthen security and democracy in our world and engage with those countries that derive their profits from the illegal drug trade is necessary to shape the environment in order to protect democracy for all.²⁵

Incorporation of the National Elements of Power

In order to effectively deal with this real threat, it is necessary to focus our strategy by using all the elements of national power, which will result in a comprehensive, successful strategy. Highlighting the important roles that diplomacy, information, military, economics, finance, law enforcement and intelligence have on creating a strategy that encompasses a unified, coordinated approach to this threat to international and national stability and security is vital in establishing a successful strategy. Resources and their commitment to fight against narco-terrorism must be focused on building trust and lasting relationships, with the end result being the complete eradication of terrorism.²⁶

The diplomatic lead rests on the DOS and the employment of the respective country teams at the embassies throughout the world, and their interaction with the host countries. The integrated use of DOS's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the respective U.S. embassy country teams will assist in establishing a tailored approach that focuses on a particular country with subsequent effect on the region. Diplomacy includes interactive involvement with our host nation partners, similar to how we are engaged in Afghanistan where DEA works with the local Afghanistan national police force by using specifically trained, Foreign Advisory Support Teams (FAST), a team of specially trained agents who are deployed to Afghanistan to assist the embassy's country teams in investigation and interdiction techniques. This FAST contingent advises, mentors, and trains our Afghan partner, resulting in cooperation, ensuring all involved are rowing in the same direction.²⁷ It should be noted that these DEA FAST teams are supported and largely funded by DOD. DOD involvement is limited to airlift and force protection so that DEA can focus on conducting bilateral investigations with their Afghan counterparts aimed at the region's drug trafficking organizations.²⁸ DEA support and involvement through a coordinating effort with DOS, DOD and our coalition partners is vital in supporting our counter-

drug effort. This cooperation is illustrated by DEA having over 86 country team offices established in 62 countries, with their newest office opening in Warsaw in 2006.²⁹

Again using our counter-drug strategy in Afghanistan as an example; it is common knowledge that heroin is a cash producing crop in the country and the proceeds go towards funding the Taliban and their terrorist agenda. Through aggressive diplomatic efforts we could influence President Karzai's government that there is an alternate to poppy production in his country, or we could provide some alternatives to poppy production. One suggestion is for the international community to buy all the poppy crops and use them for medicinal purposes, with the United Nations World Health Organization (WHO) as the conduit to ensure proper oversight. If there still remains a surplus of poppies, the WHO would buy the surplus crops and destroy them. This is a temporary solution until a more permanent agrarian solution is developed and offered as the long term substitute for Afghanistan's poppy production. The UN would lead this effort with DOS, the Department of Agriculture (DOA), DOD, and possibly the Arab League in support, along with other international and non-governmental agencies.

Diplomacy used in this way is seen as a mechanism, one of many, that promotes democracy and our national interest and protects our national security.³⁰ This means that diplomatic resources are the focus of CDS and directly assist in the formation of democracy or democratic systems.³¹ Programs such as USAID's Alternative Livelihood Program, where economic opportunities are developed, other than poppy production, is a step in the right direction. Instead of continuing to pour money into Colombia to train its military the need is for us to develop better ways for the Colombians to handle their own problems by focusing on building their criminal justice system to handle their drug problem.

Corruption once embedded in a society needs to be a vital focus area, not only from the diplomatic approach but from all other elements of national power. By developing a proactive strategy that positively develops the political and economic infrastructures of Colombia to be trustworthy is a good starting point. Representative Sam Farr from California said after five years of U.S. funding, American military advisors are still training Colombia troops and American companies are still being paid to maintain expensive U.S. furnished Black Hawk helicopters with no exit strategy being developed so that the Colombia military can assume the mission.³² In invoking the diplomatic element in our CDS, Henry Kissinger stated that although American idealism remains essential as ever, it must combine the thoughtful assessment of today's realities with a vision of a future that is conjectural.³³

The information tenet as an element of national power makes use of the soft power approach to address the proliferation of narco-terrorism. It is understood that as a psychological

dimension of warfare, it is used to influence the attitudes and behaviors of those rogue and non-state actors thereby enhancing the positive reach of regional and global communications as a significant tool of statecraft.³⁴ The focus of these efforts would come from DOS's Office of the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs working in conjunction with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs to develop a strategic communications platform that focuses on the international audience, highlighting the linkage between illegal drugs and terrorism financing. This message needs to be disseminated first by the UN to add legitimacy to its contents, which enhances the international community's acceptance of its intended message: that there is direct and real link between illegal drug profits and terrorism funding. The intent is to influence the behaviors and actions of our friends and enemies in order to attain our national security objectives, while at the same time acknowledging that to influence the world community; one must make use of these informational tools. This can be accomplished by using public diplomacy, public affairs, international broadcasting, and psychological operations.³⁵ To promote international understanding, we as a nation must use all the informational instruments at our disposal so that we may increase the international communities understanding of our values, policies and initiatives, thereby providing understanding and collaboration among our multinational allies.

The military involvement, with its significant resource base can be used as the conduit to actively support our nation's efforts in attaining success in combating narco-terrorism. Just as we used the military in the support role to counter narcotics trafficking in the United States, it can be used in the same manner when employed internationally. Domestic support to local civil authorities (without using force) provides a mechanism whereby we can use our military to train and support those host nations that are confronted with a terrorism problem the means to assist them in combating illegal drug proliferation. The United States has been engaged in this effort in Columbia for the past forty years highlighted by Columbia's internal fight against the FARC. In order to stop drug profits from funding terrorism, it is imperative that the military element of power continue its aggressive support role to democratic countries, such as Colombia, so drug interdiction campaigns can be successful.

Although it appears our military is winning the interdiction battle at sea, the influx of illegal drugs in this country is now coming through the porous region of our southwest border where 92% of illegal drugs entering this country originate.³⁶ In an attempt to secure our borders, the military's support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) must be established as a layered defense. The need is not to start at the borders but to defend as far from the border as possible. Regardless of the financial support terrorist organizations gain from illegal drug

profits, our national drug strategy must be built with the concept that a porous border adds to the flow of terrorists and their ideology into our country. It is a flawed policy to try and parse out individual organizations that are illegally trying to move people and contraband across our borders and not be concerned with their motives.

The military can assist the counter-narcotics mission and continue to support DHS in establishing a comprehensive border security program, incorporating our current detection and monitoring campaign with one that clearly defines border security issues, as evidenced by the National Guard units assisting the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) along the southwest border to augment ICE's border security mission. The value of providing DOD support domestically impacts our goal of combating terrorism. Although DOD has numerous resources, they are finite and our focus still remains and should remain national security. DOD must establish priorities for its support to the counter-narcotics mission, with the border security and interdiction of illegal drugs into the United States being areas where DOD's capabilities will provide the highest impact on the drug threat.

In the application of the economic and financial tenets to combat terrorism and illegal drug proliferation, it is important to understand that international terrorism and drug trafficking involve money that is entirely different pertaining to orders and magnitude.³⁷ As mentioned earlier, the tragedy of 9/11 is estimated to have cost the Al Qaeda operatives approximately a half million dollars, which is minuscule when compared to the revenue received from cocaine profits here in the United States.³⁸ This half million dollars is less than one-quarter of one percent of Al Qaeda's financial resources, but it is important to realize that terrorism expends rather than makes money.³⁹ On the other hand, the funds used to finance terrorist activities are part of the critical nodes that need to be targeted by the world's economic infrastructures. Identifying, through critical node analysis, those international banking institutions that process illegal monetary transactions and using effects based planning to target these banking nodes would significantly reduce the illegal profits, which would directly impact those illegal state and non-state actors who stand to gain the economic support needed to sustain their respective terrorist operations. Economic targeting of those rogue nations or criminal organizations by using our economic means to deter or compel these countries to take certain positive actions in order to stop the proliferation of drugs and the subsequent funding of terrorism is the desired end state. In combating drugs and terrorism economics is seen as a tool to create those conditions for future action or force these rogue nations to change their illegal behavior.⁴⁰ The DOS has identified 60 countries, including the United States as major money laundering countries.⁴¹ A system of systems analysis that tracks and identifies the flow of illegal currency is necessary to

distinguish and target these illegal proceeds. This type of banking oversight and cooperation not only involves the U.S. banking institutions, but also the international institutions to be successful.

The use of law enforcement, as an element of national power, is just as important in strategy incorporation as using the other elements. DEA, along with the INL, are the conduits for international support for interdicting drug proliferation. DEA focuses on identifying, targeting, investigating, disrupting and dismantling the international drug trafficking organizations and INL focuses on working with host nations to establish support mechanisms to enhance the respective host nation's opportunities to stop illegal drug production and trade. Both DEA and INL will develop personal liaisons with the host nation law enforcement infrastructure, which will enhance their capability to assist, and when necessary, intervene to deter illegal drug proliferation. As mentioned earlier, on the domestic front we have DOD supporting DEA, DHS and federal and domestic law enforcement agencies under the authority of the NDAA for FY 2004. This way each agency receives assistance to fight the counter-narcotics battle as well as counter-terrorism activities.⁴²

Actionable intelligence is a critical element of national power that if improved, will significantly assist us in determining drug trafficking patterns and the non-state and state actors that support them. The coordinated sharing of information involving both the domestic and international intelligence communities would result in clearly identifying the critical nodes and processes necessary to create success in identifying and targeting these organizations. The primary goal needs to be increasing actionable intelligence worldwide by sharing and collaborating on information that when shared will enable the world community to deal effectively with the threat. By examining intelligence on terrorism with the goal of determining linkages to the illegal narcotics trade, you must identify those networks that require disruption, which will result in curtailing the financing of their terrorist activities. By continuing to use the wide range of existing counter-narcotics and counter-terrorism authorities that focus on the economic targeting of these organizations it is possible to gain significant leverage. We need to optimize our intelligence capabilities worldwide by coordinating and sharing information.

Through its geographical combatant commanders, DOD provides unique capabilities that not only support domestic law enforcement agencies but also our international security partners. Although DOD has an abundance of resources compared to the other federal agencies, the department's focus is on national security. DOD's objectives of protecting the U.S. homeland, preventing aggression, and prevailing in the event of hostilities may consume the majority of its efforts. The judicious application of military support is necessary to ensure success with the

global war on terrorism which has the secondary goal of success with the global war on drug proliferation. The real focus of not only DOD's energies but other federal agencies is not our internal population, but the non-state and state actors that promote illegal drug trafficking and who harbor and promote terrorism.

Conclusion

Our National leaders should recognize and emphasize that in order for the United States to have a viable narco-terrorism strategy, we need to use all the elements of our national power in a cohesive, effective manner. The need is to implement a comprehensive strategy that clearly recognizes that narco-terrorism is a clear and present danger to the security of the United States, and all our national resources are needed to stop this threat. Our focus needs to be on establishing and implementing a broad, encompassing strategy, incorporating our strategy to focus on the source regions, which are the origin countries of the illicit drug trade. This type of strategy should be implemented in a progressive manner so as to ensure we attain long-term political and regional stability. All the current strategies, including, the National Drug Control Strategy, need to rely more on intervention rather than prevention. It is imperative to lean far forward in our quest to stop illegal drug proliferation, which means a comprehensive engagement plan that clearly articulates intensive dialogue and if needed, support, with those regions that produce the illicit drugs, and to attain a sincere commitment from our nation that we will stay the course, ensuring that these non-state and state actors will adopt those democratic principles for the benefit of their population. By linking our current strategies together, our result will be a more cohesive, synergistic approach to confronting illicit drug proliferation and its source of income for terrorism.

Clear, direct linkage is needed between our strategies: National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, National Strategy for Homeland Security, Strategy for Homeland Defense and Civil Support, National Military Strategic Plan for the War on Terrorism and National Drug Control Strategy. A comprehensive strategy is needed that unites counter-drug and counter-terrorism policies with the focus on eradicating the threat entirely. Regardless of the financial support that terrorist organizations gain from the illegal drug trade, there is increasing evidence that terrorist organizations are using innovative methods, government sanctioned or not, to increase the production and flow of drugs to those countries that consume their product. Therefore our national policy has to be all-encompassing. In Henry Kissinger's book, *Diplomacy*, he comments on the Wilsonian goals of America's past peace (i.e., stability, progress, and freedom for mankind) that it will have to be

sought in a journey that has no end.⁴³ Our strategy, like the global war on terror, will be a long one, but persistence will ensure positive results.

State and non-state actors and the 39 terrorist organizations identified by the DOS, require national and international attention.⁴⁴ Those state and non-state actors that prosper and promote illegal drug activity, which includes production, transport, sale, and laundering of drug money, present a clear threat to the national security of the United States. This equates to the need for counter-drug and counter-terrorism planning on a joint, multinational and interagency level with close coordination required of all participants.⁴⁵ To accomplish this, the United States needs to pay a less-dominant role so that it doesn't appear that we are trying to promote our anti-drug campaign as a pretext to be perceived as hegemonic in our policies. It is necessary to be a willing partner on the world stage with our endstate to listen to our coalition partners and using their advice in establish a cohesive, multilateral, attainable counter-drug, counter-terrorism policy. Our national commitment to shape events depends on cooperation from the international community. It is foolish for our nation to choose a path that fails to include agreement and input from the world community. Throughout history, we have served as a beacon of hope for all nations, to include those nations we once fought against and now possess diplomatic relations with. Our nature of not being bound by history depicts how we reach out and willingly assist those nations that are less influential. Our efforts should be to empower the countries of the world so that we all can live in a stable and secure world. Through multilateral cooperation, we can defeat illegal drugs, which at the same time give us the needed advantage and eventual victory in the world's global war on terror. Narco-terrorism entities look at our misdirected anti-drug campaigns and assume that they are winning the war of attrition.

Realizing that prevention and treatment are integral parts of our national drug control strategy, one must not forget that if interdiction efforts are successful prior to the arrival of illegal drugs to this country, we have made significant progress. Prevention and treatment programs are secondary to the need to interdict and eradicate the illegal drugs entering our country.

Our National focus remains upon using all elements of our national power to apply a coordinated and well thought out campaign to rid not only this country but the world of illegal drugs and integrating our counter-drug and counter-terrorism strategies. Maybe it is time to establish a National Counter-Drug director under the direct control of our National Intelligence director. The Director's focus could be the oversight of all counter-drug related activities, to include those at the international and national level; ensuring that unity of effort is maintained in combating the illegal drug trade. This counter-drug effort then can be coordinated with our

counter-terrorism effort so that those necessary resources and capabilities needed for countering illegal drug trafficking are not duplicative of our counter-terrorism efforts. Seamless integration of our counter-drug and counter-terrorism strategies is the desired endstate, resulting in a viable, functional strategy. To win decisively in our war against illegal drugs and narco-terrorism, one of our greatest strengths is synchronizing and integrating resources to combat this cancer.

Endnotes

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